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Security

ENHANCED LARGE VEHICLE INSPECTION OPERATIONS

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 31-2, *Law Enforcement.* It references policies and procedures prescribed in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism Program,* 18 August 2003; Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2000.14, *DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures,* 15 June 1994; DoDI 2000.16, *DoD Antiterrorism Standards*, 14 June 2001; DoD O-2000.12-H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence*, February 1993; Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-245, *The Air Force Antiterrorism Standards,* 21 June 2002; DoD Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Vehicle Inspection Checklist, October 23, 2000; Force Protection Battle Lab Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide, September 2002. It establishes policy and guidance for the implementation and operation of the installation Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Sites. This instruction does not apply to Air National Guard (ANG) and U.S. Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 37-123, Management of Records and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at: **https://webrims.amc.af.mil**.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This document has been revised and should be reviewed in its entirety**.** This revision provides guidance for base entry for Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) vehicles (paragraph **5.1.4.**). It also includes minor wording and format changes throughout.

1. Introduction. The bombings of the US Air Force housing complex in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, and other similar incidents, demonstrated that terrorist use of large vehicle improvised explosive devices to inflict catastrophic damages and potential for mass casualties are, and will continue to be, a threat to national security. The combination of destructive capability, access to large vehicles, and ease of obtaining materials for making lethal vehicle bombs is an incentive for terrorists. Additionally, terrorism characteristics

have dramatically changed over the past decade. The bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the suicide bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 demonstrate a trend for sensational destructive impact and mass casualties. Terrorists are imaginative; use of large vehicles, to include emergency response vehicles, to deliver a vehicle bomb is a real threat. The atrocities of 11 September 2001 changed the security environment on an international scale forever. As such, strict, long-term solutions must be developed and implemented to mitigate the threat of large vehicle improvised explosive devices (IED).

2. Implementation. Installations will develop and implement local procedures and requirements for enhanced large vehicle inspection sites (ELVIS) utilizing this instruction as the baseline.

3. Systems Approach. The "systems approach" with respect to detecting the explosive threat employs traditional vehicle search techniques and explosive detection technology into an overall strategy to detect vehicle explosives. System design relies upon successively layering these resources and tailoring these technologies to address site-specific threats, available resources, and the particular operating environment in order to progressively detect and isolate explosive threats for immediate cordon and evacuation, followed by appropriate response. The concept incorporates isolation of the ELVIS by exploiting distance and physical revetment methods in an effort to mitigate the effects of blast and fragmentation. The concept also uses available specialists to train inspection personnel. These specialists include but are not limited to the following:

3.1. Vehicle Maintenance. Vehicle maintenance personnel are invaluable in determining areas in the engine compartment, undercarriage, tires, and other areas that can conceal an explosive device.

3.2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel are experts in training personnel on explosive recognition and immediate action requirements should an explosive be detected.

3.3. Hazardous Material (HAZMAT). Hazardous material personnel are experts in training HAZMAT procedures and operations should this type of material be detected.

4. Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Sites. Each installation will establish an ELVIS for all commercial and contractor delivery vehicles entering the installation. Care should be taken when selecting the site and take into account access to the ELVIS.

4.1. ELVIS Location. Location of the ELVIS is critical. Ideally, the ELVIS should be established in a remote location at least 2000 feet from any inhabited areas or areas containing Protection Level 1-3 resources. These facilities should provide separate deceleration/access lanes into the ELVIS and enough room for vehicles to safely wait for inspection.

4.1.1. Fragmentation and Blast Zone Hazards. Fragmentation and blast zones are key elements to consider when orientating the ELVIS but may be mitigated through the establishment and utilization of an effective barrier plan. Examples of fragmentation and blast zone hazard design features can be found in references such as the Force Protection Battlelab Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide.

4.1.1.1. Fragmentation zone hazards are in front and behind the vehicle. Fragmentation zone hazards can generally be mitigated effectively with the placement of earth based barriers (berms, hesco bastion barriers, sandbags) at the front and rear of the vehicle.

4.1.1.2. Blast zone hazards extend up to several thousand feet from both sides of the vehicle depending on the size and make-up of the explosive device. Blast zone hazards can generally be mitigated through the use and combination of concrete barriers and earth barriers. Dense vegetation can also help mitigate the primary blast hazard.

4.2. ELVIS Inspection Areas. Ideally, each ELVIS should include the three areas listed below (**Figure A3.1.**); however, manpower, location, size, and other limiting factors unique to each installation must be considered. As a minimum, each ELVIS must have an Inspection Area.

4.2.1. Pre-Inspection Area. A pre-inspection area is used to gather information about the driver and check documentation that may indicate suspicious activity or a threat situation. Required documentation may vary but normally consists of the vehicle registration, driver's license, logbook, manifest, and shipping papers or bill of lading. During the driver interview, the inspector must observe the individual's behavior while observing the vehicle for physical abnormalities. Typical questions include: What is your citizenship?; where do you live?; where are you going?; what is the name/position of the person you are to see?; what is your cargo?; where did you come from?; who is your employer?; do you own the vehicle? However, it should not be assumed that the average local national truck driver possesses the necessary English language skills to answer these questions without the aid of an interpreter. Therefore, an interpreter or language cards should be available to assist. See **Attachment 2** for driver interview responses that may raise suspicions.

4.2.2. Inspection Area. The inspection area is the location where the vehicle inspection is accomplished. This area ideally is covered to offer protection from the elements for the inspectors and the system monitoring equipment. Each inspection area should have large-print signs posted in English and the host nation language that spell out the procedure. Minimum manning for each inspection point within the inspection area is outlined below.

4.2.2.1. One armed security forces member providing "armed over-watch". The armed over-watch is responsible for providing a show of force and final denial to the installation entry control point. Standard use of force rules apply.

4.2.2.2. Two vehicle inspectors.

4.2.2.3. One explosive detection technology equipment operator per piece of equipment. The armed over-watch and two vehicle inspectors will not operate the explosive detection technology equipment.

4.2.2.4. One explosive detector dog (EDD) team (if available).

4.2.2.5. One interpreter (if available).

4.2.3. Post-Inspection Area. The post-inspection area is used for further verification of required documentation and to sign-in visitors onto the installation. Utilize AF Form 1109, **Visitors Register Log**.

5. ELVIS Requirements:

5.1. Requirements. As a minimum, all vehicles (except those listed in **paragraphs 5.1.1.** through **5.1.4.** below) larger than an extended cab pick-up truck (6-passenger) or passenger van will be inspected, to include but not limited to tractor/trailer (box and flat-bed containing cargo), tanker trucks, box trucks, tour buses, garbage/recycled waste trucks, concrete trucks/mixers, dump trucks,

cranes, recreational vehicles, petroleum tankers, and postal/mail trucks will receive complete inspections.

5.1.1. Mission Essential and Daily Delivery Vehicles. Installation commanders will determine, and designate in writing, those mission essential and daily delivery cleared contractor large vehicles that will be exempted from the large vehicle inspection process. These are normally vehicles whose entry onto the installation cannot be delayed due to mission essential requirements or enter the base on a daily basis. Installation commanders should consider establishing a random process for periodically inspecting these types of vehicles.

5.1.2. School Buses. School buses will not process through the ELVIS. Installations will establish local security and control procedures to safely and securely expedite school bus entry onto the installation. Coordinate school bus entry procedures through the installation force protection working group and the Department of Defense Dependents School (DoDDS) liaison, and include these procedures in the installation DoDDS Force Protection Plan.

5.1.3. Privately Owned Vehicles (POV). Installations will inspect POVs in accordance with local directives and procedures established in force protection conditions and random antiterrorism measures. Ideally, POV inspections will be conducted in established areas at installation entry control points; however, POV inspections may be conducted at the ELVIS as dictated by mission requirements and threat.

5.1.4. Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) Vehicles. Most AAFES and DeCA delivery vehicles undergo strict inventory and sealing procedures prior to departure from their central distribution points to protect merchandise from fraud and theft. An expedited search at the ELVIS by verifying seal numbers against cargo manifests or bills of lading and an external inspection of the vehicle may suffice prior to entry onto the installation. Installation commanders should consider establishing expedited inspection procedures for AAFES and DeCA delivery vehicles based upon threat levels. If established, installation commanders must designate such procedures in writing and must include sufficient requirements for external inspections designed to detect any external threats and to detect any efforts to place threat items inside the vehicles.

5.2. Contractor and Commercial Vendor Entry Procedures:

5.2.1. Cleared Contractors and Commercial Vendors. Contractors and commercial vendors with proper background checks and authorized passes should be permitted unescorted entry to the installation after successful completion of a vehicle inspection. Installation commanders and higher headquarters are authorized to impose stricter controls, i.e., requiring escorts from requesting agency, if the threat dictates.

5.2.2. Un-cleared Contractors and Commercial Vendors. Contractors and commercial vendors without proper background checks and authorized passes will be escorted onto the installation after successful completion of the vehicle inspection. Escorts will remain with the vehicle at all times while it is on the installation. Escorts accompanying un-cleared contractors and commercial vehicles will be issued communications, i.e. cell phone or land mobile radio (LMR), to provide the capability to immediately contact the law enforcement desk , or equivalent agency, in the event of an emergency. Unless otherwise required, escorts for contractors and commercial vendors themselves are not necessary. These escorts are for the vehicles. Installations should consider maintaining a pool of personnel from appropriate requesting agencies, base details, or a combination of

both to perform escort duty. Installation commanders are responsible for establishing procedures to ensure personnel are available to perform escort duty.

6. ELVIS Procedures. The ELVIS procedures consist of a combination of manual inspection techniques and explosive detection technology (if available) to optimize detection capability.

6.1. Manual Inspection Techniques. Manual Inspections Techniques are the "baseline" of any vehicle inspection, to include large vehicle inspections, and consist of a visual and physical inspection of a vehicle by an individual (security forces member or augmentee) and EDD. The inspection may also incorporate the use of an under vehicle mirror or under vehicle "creeper," if available.

6.1.1. Vehicle drivers should precede the inspector and open all doors, compartments, the hood, and trunk (if applicable). Inspection team members will not perform these tasks-no exceptions.

6.1.2. All passengers must exit the vehicle and move to a pre-designated location away from the inspection area and remain in this area until the vehicle inspection is completed.

6.1.3. All inspections should be conducted in a systematic and consistent manner, i.e. clockwise or counter-clockwise. Use USAFE IMT 204, **Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection (ELVIS) Checklist** to standardize and record large vehicle searches. ***NOTE***: This is not an all-inclusive checklist; installations are encouraged to localize, as required.

6.1.4. Any operation or movement of the vehicle must be performed by the vehicle driver. Inspection team members will not perform these tasks-no exceptions. Additionally, all personnel must stand and remain clear of a vehicle in motion and remain alert to all other vehicle traffic within and around the area.

6.2. Explosive Detection Technology. Numerous commercial off-the shelf (COTS) devices are available to complement manual inspection techniques. These, as well as emerging technologies, help constitute a robust detection capability at the ELVIS. Refer to operator manuals for specific equipment operations and employment methods. Prior to purchasing a device that generates ionizing radiation, contact the base Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) regarding applicable licensing procedures. Units that currently have radiation producing devices must comply with requirements of their radioactive material license to maintain exposures as low as reasonably achievable.

6.2.1. Ion Scanner. Ion scanners are used to detect traces of explosive elements and offer the best detection results when used in concert with EDD. General-purpose areas of the vehicle such as steering wheels and door handles, or suspicious areas such as clean areas amidst extremely dirty areas, new welds, and suspicious wires should be swabbed. The ion scanner should be used prior to the EDD to avoid contamination.

6.2.2. Under Vehicle Surveillance System (UVSS). The UVSS uses a combination of black and white and color pan and tilt cameras to examine a vehicle's undercarriage. Vehicles must drive over the UVSS at a slow rate of speed to enable the operator to examine all areas of the undercarriage.

6.2.3. Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS). The VACIS is an X-ray system that allows the operator to see inside enclosed areas of a vehicle; however, the VACIS is not an IED detector since the system relies upon operator interpretation of a vehicle scan. For example, some AAFES and DeCA vehicles may have uneven pallets based on the nature of their load, which may unnec-

essarily raise suspicions at times. The VACIS should only be employed as a cueing or alerting device for inspection personnel but can be used effectively in concert with the UVSS.

6.2.4. Vehicle Explosive Detection System (VEDS). The VEDS uses an electronic neutron generator (ENG) to produce a "beam" of neutrons aimed at the suspect cargo. When these neutrons strike the nucleus of an atom, they produce gamma rays with a signature unique to the target material. By analysis of this gamma signal, VEDS is able to detect the presence of specific compounds, such as nitrogen which is found in many explosives. Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) technology provides a feature that is not technically possible with pure imaging systems-the ability to provide a "red light-green".

7. Additional Considerations:

7.1. ELVIS Hours of Operation and Designated Delivery Hours. Consider establishing ELVIS hours of operation and designated delivery hours to complement mission readiness and minimize the threat.

7.2. Off-Site Shipping and Receiving. Where possible and when dictated by the threat, consider establishing off-site shipping and receiving procedures. For example, a critical facility can have off-site shipping and receiving where all deliveries are made and then transshipped to the main facility.

7.3. Large Vehicle "Truck" Routes. The establishment of large vehicle "truck" routes on the installation should be considered to help minimize the threat to inhabited areas or areas containing Protection Level 1-3 resources.

7.4. Forms prescribed: USAFE IMT 204, **Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Site (ELVIS) Checklist**.

7.5. Forms adopted: AF Form 1109, **Visitor Register Log**.

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Director of Security Forces

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFPD 31-2, *Law Enforcement*

AFI 10-245, *The Air Force Antiterrorism Standards*

DoDD 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism Program*

DoDI 2000.14, *DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures*

DoDI 2000.16, *DoD Antiterrorism Standards*

DoD O-2000.12-H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence*

DoD Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Vehicle Inspection Checklist

Force Protection Battle Lab Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAFES—Army and Air Force Exchange Service

COTS—Commercial Off-The-Shelf

DeCA—Defense Commissary Agency

DoDDS—Department of Defense Dependents School

EDD—Explosive Detector Dog

ELVIS—Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Site

ENG—Electronic Neutron Generator

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

HAZMAT—Hazardous Material

IED—Improvised Explosive Devices

LMR—Land Mobile Radio

POV—Privately Owned Vehicle

RSO—Radiation Safety Officer

TNA—Thermal Neutron Analysis

TSWG—Technical Support Working Group

UVSS—Under Vehicle Surveillance System

VACIS—Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System

VEDS—Vehicle Explosive Detection System

Attachment 2

DRIVER INTERVIEW RESPONSES THAT MAY RAISE SUSPICION

Table A2.1. INTERVIEW REACTION SAMPLES

PHYSICAL MANIFESTATIONS				
Turning red	Turning pale	Obvious shaking	Refuse eye contact	Darting of eyes
Excessive blinking	Evasive eyes, looking at floor	Frowning	Biting or chewing lips	Sweating profusely
Fidgeting/nervous hands	Scratching repeatedly	Hiding hands	Folding arms across chest	Exaggerated movements
Moving rapidly or tensely	Appearing restless	Restless shifting of weight	Placing hands inside groin area	Sitting on edge of seat
AUDITORY MANIFESTATIONS				
Inability to answer	Reluctance to answer	Answer question with a question	Continually asks to clarify question	Shaky voice
Deep sighs	Repeatedly clears throat	Grinds teeth	Yawning	Dry mouth
Hesitancy of speech	Repeats your questions	Stuttering	Voice cracking	Responds with unrelated info
NOTE: Influence questioner with words of qualification: “honestly,” “truthfully,” “believe me,” “To tell the truth,” “To be perfectly frank,” “May God strike me dead,” “I wouldn’t lie to you.”				

Attachment 3

SAMPLE ENHANCED LARGE VEHICLE INSPECTION SITE DIAGRAM

Figure A3.1. Site Diagram